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In the early 1980s both Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam defended theories
that superficially appear to be coherence theories of truth, but that upon closer
inspection turn out to be better understood as coherence theories of justification
(or  perhaps,  not  as  coherence theories  at  all).  In  Reason,  Truth and History
(1981a), Putnam argued that “truth is an idealization of rational acceptability”
(55), and that rational acceptability of statements is their “coherence and fit”
(id.). And in the same year Davidson gave a talk that would be published two
years later as “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” (1983) in which
he  defended  “what  may as  well  be  called  a  coherence  theory  of  truth  and
knowledge” (137). There are more interesting similarities between Putnam’s and
Davidson’s theories than their closeness in dates of birth, however, and in later
work Putnam’s theory further converged with Davidson’s. Furthermore, the most
conspicuous difference – the role and nature of “conceptual schemes” – turns out
to be smaller and more subtle than it may seem at a first glance. 
This  paper  introduces  Putnam’s  and  Davidson’s  coherence  theories,  and
discusses  the most  important  differences  and similarities.  The following two
sections  summarize  “middle”  Putnam’s  and  Davidson’s  coherence  theories
respectively. The two sections after that look into the apparent disagreement on
the possibility of different conceptual schemes, and discuss further developments
in Putnam’s view and the consequent convergence of Putnam’s and Davidson’s
coherentisms. The final section briefly compares the resulting – largely shared –
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theory  with  more  recent  conceptions  of  coherentism and  concludes  that  by
current standards, Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories are not coherence theories
but hybrids between coherentism and foundationalism.
As  will  become  apparent  in  the  following,  both  Putnam’s  and  Davidson’s
writings resist easy interpretation, albeit for very different reasons. Interpreting
Putnam is complicated by his changes of mind; interpreting Davidson by his
obscurity.  Putnam belonged to the rare breed of thinkers that aren’t afraid to
reject their own ideas upon realization of their incoherence. For some time in the
1960s and early 1970s, he was at the forefront of analytic philosophy, but when
he became increasingly aware of problems and contradictions in the mainstream
view he had helped to build, he left it behind. And when he found problems in
the views he defended next (in his “middle” period), he left those behind as well.
In  this  process  he  became  more  and  more  critical  of  mainstream  analytic
philosophy.1 More  importantly,  because  of  this  continuing development,  one
cannot look for clarification of Putnam’s ideas in his own (much) earlier or later
writings. In contrast, in case of Davidson, one  has  to look for clarification in
earlier and later writings.
Contrary to Putnam, changes in Davidson’s philosophical  views are few and
subtle. Davidson was a systematic thinker, and as he suggested in (1990), much
of his system was already in place in the early 1960s. That system was built on
Quine’s  (with  some modifications),  and  consequently,  like  Quine,  Davidson
rejected  many  of  the  core  beliefs  of  mainstream  analytic  philosophy.2 By
implication, his philosophical  ideas and terminology (like Quine’s) cannot be
taken at face value (let alone lifted out of their context), and can only be properly
understood within the broader program they are part  of  (e.g. Malpas 2011a;
Brons  2014).  But  there  are  further  complications  in  interpreting  Davidson’s
1 For example, in “After Empiricism” (1985), Putnam writes that analytic philosophy is “total
shambles”,  that  its  achievements  are  entirely  negative  and  that  it  has  only  “succeeded  in
destroying the very problem with which it started”, that it has “failed”, and that it is “at a dead
end” (51). 
2 But unlike Quine (and Putnam) it appears that Davidson was not always fully aware of this. In
fact, he was even surprised when he was characterized as “post-analytic” (1993a).
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writings.  “His style was too cryptic and elliptical, so that it was often unclear
what his claims or arguments were,” said Timothy Williamson about Davidson
in an interview (Williamson & Bo 2009: 60).3 Williamson is not a Davidsonian,
of course, but similar remarks, differing more in tone than in content, can be
found in the writings of philosophers closer to Davidson.4 
Davidson himself once described his style as “breathless”,5 and this seems a
fitting adjective. Most of his essays were talks originally, and even those that
were not read like lecture transcripts: style and tone are informal, and usually the
same applies to the reasoning. Because of this, upon a first and cursory reading
many of Davidson’s essays seem to make sense (perhaps to be convincing even),
but second, third, and further readings to figure out what exactly his argument is
often result  in  puzzlement  and more questions than answers.  Sometimes the
answers to such questions can be found elsewhere in Davidson’s writings, but
this only points at a related problem already hinted at above: understanding a
single text by Davidson usually requires (at least some) familiarity with all of his
writings.
Putnam on rational acceptability
Hilary Putnam developed a kind of coherentism as part of the “internal realism”
that he defended from 1976 until he gave it up in favor of “natural realism” in
the early 1990s (see  especially 1999).  It  is  not  clear,  however,  whether  this
3 Williamson continues: “in response to questions or objections, he was defensive and guarded,
doing little to articulate his ideas more explicitly,” but this is not entirely accurate in my opinion.
Rather, I would say that Davidson’s “responses” were not responses at all: he rarely addressed the
issues  raised  by  those  he  was  responding  to.  Nevertheless,  in  some  “responses”,  he  did
(somewhat) clarify his ideas, and consequently, these are valuable sources. Examples of this are
many of the responses in Hahn (1999) and (Davidson 2001a).
4 For example, Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (2005) write about some apparently critical aspect
of Davidson’s theory of triangulation that “the suggestion is not spelled out enough for it to be
clear what is intended” (408n), and Peter Pagin’s (2001) influential analysis of that same theory
is littered with statements like “if I understand him” and other expressions of uncertainty and
puzzlement.
5 “… let me continue in my breathless way through one more chapter” (1988a: 43).
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change  also  implies  a  rejection  of  his  coherence  theory,  or  merely  an
amendment. I will interpret it as the latter below (after introducing Davidson’s
theory),  and  will  briefly  introduce  the  original,  internal  realist  version  of
Putnam’s coherentism in this section. Before proceeding, it must be mentioned,
however, that Putnam did not use the term “coherence theory” himself. In fact,
he  rejected  the  label  “coherence  theory  of  truth”  because  of  its  (to  him)
unacceptable connotations.
In Reason, Truth and History (1981a) Putnam argues that there are two opposing
philosophical perspectives. One is that of metaphysical realism or  externalism,
which  assumes  that  “the  world  consists  of  some  fixed  totality  of  mind-
independent facts” and that “there is exactly one true and complete description of
‘the way the word is’” (49). The externalist theory of truth is correspondentist:
truth  is  some  kind  of  correspondence  relation  of  words  (etc.)  with  external
things. Externalism requires and assumes the possibility of an external point of
view, which Putnam aptly characterizes as a “God’s Eye point of view” (id.).
The other perspective – the one Putnam preferred – is that of  internalism or
internal realism. According to internalism, a question like “What objects does the
world consist of?” can only be sensibly asked (and answered) “within a theory or
description” (id.), and an internalist theory may hold “that there is more than one
‘true’ theory or description of the world” (id.). About the notion of truth in the
internalist perspective, he wrote that:
‘Truth’ … is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability – some sort of ideal
coherence  of  our  beliefs  with  each  other  and  with  our  experiences  as  those
experiences  are  themselves  represented  in  our  belief  system –  and  not
correspondence  with  mind-independent  or  discourse-independent  ‘states  of
affairs’.  There is  no God’s  Eye  point  of  view that  we  can  know or  usefully
imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting
various  interests  and  purposes  that  their  descriptions  and  theories  subserve.
(1981a: 49-50; italics in original)6
6 On “truth” in internal realism, see also (Putnam 1983a; 1983b).
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While Putnam noted that internalism does not necessarily hold that  there are
multiple true descriptions of the world, his internal realism does hold this claim.
The  externalist  (or  Aristotelian/medieval/Kripkean  essentialist)  idea  of  self-
identifying  objects  makes  no  sense.7 Rather,  “‘objects’  do  not  exist
independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we
introduce one or another scheme of description” (52). And there are multiple
ways to do that “cutting up”: there are (at least sometimes) “equally coherent but
incompatible conceptual schemes which fit our experience equally well” (73).
That doesn’t mean that “anything goes”, however, or that any conceptual scheme
is  as  good  as  any  other.  Internal  coherence  is  not  the  only  constraint  on
knowledge – there are “experiential inputs” to knowledge as well. These inputs
are partially shaped by our concepts (or conceptual schemes), but only partially,
and rational acceptability of some set of beliefs also requires coherence with
these experiential inputs.
What  makes  a  statement,  or  a  whole  system  of  statements  –  a  theory  or
conceptual scheme – rationally acceptable is, in large part its coherence and fit;
coherence of “theoretical” of less experiential beliefs with one another and with
more  experiential  beliefs,  and  also  coherence  of  experiential  beliefs  with
theoretical beliefs. (1981a: 54-5)
Despite the above quoted claim that, for the internalist, truth is some sort of
rational  acceptability,  Putnam rejects  the  identification of  truth  with  rational
acceptability. “Truth cannot simply be rational acceptability for one fundamental
reason; truth is supposed to be a property of a statement that cannot be lost,
whereas justification can be lost” (55). In other words, it is  justification that is
identified  with  rational  acceptability  (and  thus  coherence)  rather  than  truth,
which means that Putnam’s coherentism is a coherence theory of justification.
7 See also (1981b) and (1983a): “The idea … – i.e., that nature itself determines what our words
stand for – is totally unintelligible. At bottom, to think that a sign-relation is  built into nature is to
revert to medieval essentialism, to the idea that there are ‘self-identifying objects’ and ‘species’
out there” (xii).
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Nevertheless,  Putnam  does  associate  truth  with  “some  sort  of”  rational
acceptability: “truth  is an  idealization of rational acceptability. We speak as if
there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions, and we call a statement
‘true’ if it would be justified under such conditions” (55; underlining added).8
“Truth”  is  not  defined as  idealized  rational  acceptability  (or  “idealized
justification”; p. 122) either, however. The logical nature of underlined “is” and
“if” in the last quote is that of coincidence and material equivalence respectively,
not that  of conceptual identity and logical equivalence. The relation between
truth and idealized justification must be one of material equivalence because it
makes  no  sense  to  suppose  that  a  statement  could  be  justified  under  ideal
epistemic conditions and false nevertheless,9 but there is no reason to suppose it
is stronger than material equivalence. This raises the question how – according to
Putnam – “truth” should be defined, but unfortunately, in Putnam’s writings of
the last two or three decades it tends to be (much) clearer what he rejects than
what (exactly) he accepts, and this is the case for “truth” as well.
Davidson’s “coherence theory”
Donald  Davidson  defended  his  brand  of  coherentism most  explicitly  in  “A
Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” (1983), but it is connected to many
other of his writings and ideas. Despite the title of the ’83 paper, Davidsonian
coherentism is not a coherence theory of truth and/or knowledge. As Davidson
8 In (1983b) he writes: “A statement is true, in my view, if it would be justified under epistemically
ideal conditions” (84).
9 Putnam first made the claim that “the supposition that even an ‘ideal’ theory (…) might really be
false appears to collapse into unintelligibility” in (1976). That it is, is easy to see if one considers
the implications of this supposition (but it should be noted that the following is not Putnam’s
argument).  If  there  would  be  something  that  is  undetectable  even under  ideal epistemic
conditions, then that (kind of) thing would be  absolutely isolated from anything in the  ideally
detectable universe, meaning that it  would have no effect or influence of any other kind on
anything (in the same ideally detectable universe). That would require it to be non-physical and
without physical causes or effects. Hence, it  would not just be unknowable, but also utterly
mysterious, and given its absolute lack of causal powers also completely irrelevant. The idea of
supposing such a (kind of) thing indeed makes no sense.
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later admitted (1987b), the title is misleading and chosen badly. The sloganesque
phrase “coherence yields correspondence” (1983: 137) in the first paragraph is
equally  misleading,  but  at  the  same  time  oddly  accurate  as  a  summary  of
Davidson’s  argument.  What makes it  misleading – like the paper’s title – is
Davidson’s idiosyncratic use of terms like “coherence” or “coherence theory”
and “correspondence”.
Firstly, Davidsonian coherentism is not a coherence theory of truth because there
can be no theory of truth, or at least no theory that is not “empty or wrong”
(1987b: 155). Truth is a primitive, it is “as clear and basic a concept as we have”
(id.).  A theory of truth as a definition of truth and/or a specification of what
makes a belief true adds nothing to our understanding of what truth is. “Truth is
correspondence with the way things are” (1983: 139), but correspondence does
not  make a belief true: correspondence is what “truth” means, not what truth
requires. According to (the most common version of) the correspondence theory,
correspondence to facts makes beliefs or sentences true. Davidson rejects the
truth-making element thereof, but also the specific idea of facts as truth-makers.
According to Davidson, there are no distinct  facts; there is  at most one fact
(1969),  and  consequently,  “there  is  nothing  for  sentences  to  correspond  to”
(1987b: 183). Hence, the intentionally vague phrasing as “correspondence with
the way things are”.
Secondly, Davidson rejects the empiricist notion of justification of beliefs by
sense data (or something similar). This argument is related to his rejection of
conceptual schemes and the “third dogma of empiricism” in (1974), and further
elaborated in “The Myth of the Subjective” (1988a). The core idea is  that the
relation between sensations and beliefs is causal: sensations cause beliefs, but a
cause is not a justification. Furthermore, beliefs are propositional and the only
thing that can justify a proposition is another (set of) proposition(s). Sensation,
however, is not propositional and there is no special class of intermediate beliefs
such as “observation sentences”.  If there is a distinction between observation
sentences and other kinds of beliefs, it is a distinction of their causes, not of their
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justifications (1983: 145-6). Regardless of the kind or nature of a belief, “nothing
can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” (141).
Davidson suggests a few times in the first pages of his “A Coherence Theory”
that coherence is a  test of truth, but these suggestions should not be confused
with the idea that coherence makes a belief true, however – that would be getting
things the wrong way around. Coherence can be a test of truth because according
to Davidson, each of our beliefs may be false, but not all of them can be wrong
(140),  and  consequently,  coherence  with  our  necessarily mostly true  beliefs,
justifies the belief that a belief is true. More precisely: coherence does not make
a first-order belief true, but justifies a second-order belief  x that a first-order
belief y is true. Hence, Davidson’s theory is a coherence theory of justification.
The question, of course, is why coherence would justify the second-order belief
that  a  first-order  belief  is  true.  “Mere  coherence,  no  matter  how  strongly
coherence is plausibly defined, cannot guarantee that  what is believed is so”
(1983: 138). However, it can and does if it is the case that “most of the beliefs in
a coherent set of beliefs are true” (id.). According to Davidson this is the case
because “belief is in its nature veridical” (146). In “a Coherence Theory” (and
elsewhere) he offered two closely related arguments for this claim. What relates
the two arguments is that both depend on the triangle of speaker, interpreter, and
a shared world. In Davidson’s early writings this triangle plays a central role in
his theory of radical interpretation; in his later writings the triangular figure is
used  to  explain  intersubjectivity,  among others.  The “omniscient  interpreter”
argument for the veridicality of belief (which first appeared in 1977) is based on
the former, and most commentators focus on this argument. However, Davidson
himself later rejected it as a “sortie into science fiction” (1999b: 192).
The  second  –  and  more  important  –  argument  is  closely  related  to  the
aforementioned  causal  theory  of  mental  content  and  belief.  Davidson
summarizes  this  argument  in  a  key passage  near  the  end  of  “A Coherence
Theory” as follows:
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What stands in the way of global skepticism of the senses is, in my view, the fact
that we must,  in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take the
objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief. And what we, as interpreters,
must  take them to be is  what  they in  fact  are.  Communication  begins where
causes converge: your utterance means what mine does if belief in its truth is
systematically caused by the same events and objects. (1983: 151)
Communication and language learning require the same triangle of speaker (or
teacher), interpreter (or learner), and a shared world as that required by (radical)
interpretation. The interpreter/learner can not make sense of a word if she does
not share an experience of the object or event referred to by the speaker/teacher
in  using  that  word.  At  the  most  basic  level,  our  words  are  (and  must  be)
grounded through a social process in a shared, real, external world. 
Although this is the same triangle as that of radical interpretation, Davidson’s
theory of “triangulation” or “ostensive learning” turns that triangle on its head.
The theory has weaker and stronger versions or applications. Weaker versions
are intended to explain the source and possibility of intersubjective truth (e.g.
1982a).  Stronger  versions  elaborate  Davidson’s  claim  that  “successful
communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely true, view of the
world” (1977: 201).  In  its  strongest  form, the theory of triangulation can be
interpreted as a transcendental argument: from the fact that we do communicate
it follows that there is such a shared world, that there are other minds, and that
our beliefs about the shared world are mostly true (e.g. Davidson 1987a; 1991;
see also Sosa 2003).10 It’s a variant of the stronger form that provides the second
argument for the veridicality of belief: the facts that we do have language and are
able to communicate prove that most of our most basic beliefs must be true.
10 Davidson tended to retreat from stronger versions of triangulation to weaker ones in response to
criticism. See, for example, various replies in Hahn (1999) and (Davidson 2001a).
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conceptual schemes
There is much that Putnam and Davidson would have been able to agree upon
(provided  that  differences  in  background,  style,  and  terminology  wouldn’t
obstruct  mutual  understanding).  Most  fundamentally,  both  argue  that  –  as
Putnam (1981a) phrases it – “the notion of comparing our systems of beliefs
with unconceptualized reality to see if they match makes no sense” (130), and
that  we can only justify our beliefs  (etc.)  by appealing to  other  beliefs  and
coherence  therewith.  But  there  are  also  important  differences,  and  there  are
problems especially in Putnam’s theory, which lead him to give up “internal
realism” in the 1990s (see next section). 
The  most  conspicuous  difference  between  Putnam’s  internal  realism  and
Davidson’s  philosophy  concerns  conceptual  schemes.  Putnam  claims  that
description is relative to conceptual schemes and that there are “incompatible
conceptual  schemes”,  while  Davidson  famously  rejects  the  “very  idea”  of
conceptual schemes in (1974). The extent of difference on this issue should not
be  exaggerated,  however.  The  gap  is  made  to  look  wider  than  it  is  by
terminological and stylistic differences, and by established preconceptions about
Putnam and Davidson; it can be narrowed by looking below the surface.
Davidson did not reject all notions of conceptual schemes (and thus not “the very
idea”,  despite  the  title  of  1974),  but  only a  particular  notion  of  conceptual
schemes  that  he ascribed  to  Whorf,  Kuhn,  and Quine,  among others.11 That
particular notion is one of untranslatable schemes. Additionally, he rejected an
idea that he assumed to be inherently related to the notion of conceptual schemes
and  that  he  called  “the  third  dogma  of  empiricism”:  the  idea  of  epistemic
intermediaries between the world and our minds. The latter rejection was further
developed in “The Myth of the Subjective” (1988a). (We’ll turn to this topic in
the next section.)
11 In (Brons 2011) I show that Davidson misinterpreted Whorf and Kuhn and claimed that he only
rejected a Quinean notion of conceptual schemes. I have come to believe that the latter claim is
wrong, and that Davidson misunderstood Quine as well.
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That Davidson did not completely reject the notion of conceptual schemes is
evidenced  by his  own occasional  use  of  the  term.  For  example,  in  “Seeing
Through Language” (1997) he recognized that there are (or can be) “differences
or provincialisms in our conceptual schemes. But these are variants or features
we can explain to one another, or could, given enough time, adequate attention,
and sufficient intelligence on both sides” (128; see also 1999c).
In  (1974)  and  elsewhere  Davidson  rejected  the  idea  of  untranslatable or
incommensurable conceptual schemes, but even though the above quoted term
“incompatible”  may  seem  to  suggest  otherwise,  Putnam  (1981a)  rejected
incommensurability between schemes as well (see 114ff). Hence, the difference
between Putnam and Davidson with regards to schemes is not one of rejection
versus acceptance, but one of the degree of possible difference between schemes.
According  to  Quine  (1960)  different  conceptual  schemes  commit  us  to  the
existence of different  things;  that  is,  different schemes  posit different things.
Putnam and Davidson appear to disagree about our freedom in positing things.
More specifically, they appear to give different answers to the question whether
our posits (or positings) follow inherent “joints” in nature or external reality.
“Appear to” because Putnam’s answer to this question is clear – it is a negative
answer12 – but Davidson’s is not.
One of Davidson’s arguments against conceptual schemes in (1974) is that those
“organize” what is already organized. This argument makes sense only if it is
interpreted as meaning that nature or reality provides that prior organization. His
arguments in (1992) and (1993b) similarly seem to depend on the presupposition
of an external reality consisting of (or pre-organized into) discrete objects and
events, and in (1999d) Davidson argued for the existence of “divisions in nature”
explicitly:
12 According to Putnam there are no joints or self-identifying objects: “we cut up the world into
objects” (1981a: 52). See also above.
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Nature is pretty much how we think it is. There really are people and atoms and
stars, given what we mean by the words. The infertility of hybrids defines real
species, though this matters only to those interested in the relevant concepts. This
explains why it is foolish to deny that these divisions exist in nature, whether or
not anyone entertains the thought. Even if no one had ever had a concept, there
would be species, though of course this is our concept and our word, born of our
interests. (38)
Furthermore, Davidson’s notion of causality as a law-like relation between kinds
of events presupposes that events come in discrete natural kinds (and perhaps
even kinds with causal essences). And the fact that he called the irreducibility of
kinds of mental events to kinds of brain events “anomalous monism” strongly
suggests that he not just took natural kinds for granted, but their reducibility to
more  basic,  physical  kinds  as  well  (otherwise  there  wouldn’t  be  anything
“anomalous”  about  the  mind),  and  as  John  Dupré  (1993)  has  shown,  such
reducibility requiries natural kinds to have structural essences.
Although  this  may seem  to  settle  the  question  –  Davidson’s  answer  to  the
question whether our posits follow inherent joints in nature was positive – that
may be too hasty. None of the “textual evidence” is unambiguous, and Samuel
Wheeler  (2014),  for  example,  has  argued  that  Davidson  actually  held  the
opposite position (i.e. that he denied joints in reality). Furthermore, Frank Farell
(1994),  Jeff  Malpas  (2001b),  and  me  (Brons  2012;  2013)  have  defended
interpretations or extensions of Davidson’s philosophy that  give (moderately)
negative (i.e. joint-denying) answers as well. If these interpretations are right (or
these  extensions  don’t  deviate  all  too  radically  from their  source),  then  the
difference between Putnam and Davidson on the matter of conceptual schemes
turns out to be very small; but even if they are wrong, Putnam and Davidson are
considerably closer than they seemed at first hand.
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convergence
In the early 1990s Putnam became increasingly aware of a number of problems
with internal realism, which resulted in his rejection of that theory in favor of
“natural realism” (in or before the Dewey Lectures given in 1994 and published
in 1999). Some of these problems relate directly to his coherence theory, but as
mentioned before, it is not clear whether the switch to natural realism implies a
rejection or amendment of his coherentism. Perhaps, the lack of a clear positive
theory in  Putnam’s writings of  this  period should be taken  to  mean that  he
intended natural realism to be an amendment rather than a substitute. Because in
the present context it is more productive to treat it as an amendment indeed, that
is what I will assume it is.
The most common objection to coherence theories is that they seem to imply that
any coherent system of beliefs is as good as any other coherent system of beliefs.
Putnam (1981a) and Davidson had different answers to that objection. Putnam’s
answer  was  that  the  choice  between  conceptual  schemes  is  constrained  by
experiential  inputs  which  are  partially  conceptual,  and  that  we judge  whole
schemes by – among others – their coherence with experiential inputs. But this
suggestion results in a dilemma. If these experiential inputs are (even partially)
conceptual indeed, then they are already (largely) determined by a scheme and
thus  cannot  function  as  scheme-independent  constraints.  If  they  are  not
conceptual  (to  a  significant  extent)  then  this  (testing  for)  coherence  with
experiential inputs is nothing but another variety of “comparing our systems of
beliefs with unconceptualized reality to see if they match” (1981a: 130), which
“makes no sense” (id.). Putnam (1999) opted for the first horn of this dilemma,
and thus gave up on the idea of external coherence of a scheme with experience
(or experiential beliefs or inputs).13
13 It  is  a  peculiar  twist  that  what  lead  to  the  rejection  of  internal  realism  is  that  it  wasn’t
(consistently) internal enough.
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A few pages back I mentioned that Davidson’s (1974) rejection of the notion of
conceptual  schemes  was  related  to  his  rejection  of  “the  third  dogma  of
empiricism”: the idea of epistemic intermediaries between the world and our
minds. In The Threefold Cord (1999) Putnam focuses his attention on perception
to develop a similar view. He characterizes the belief in an interface between the
mind and the (external) world as “Cartesian” and “disastrous” (43). In perception
we have direct and unmediated contact with the world, but it is a  conceptual
contact.  Davidson similarly rejects  the idea of  non-conceptual  (or  even non-
propositional) perception. “What the senses ‘deliver’ (i.e., cause) in perception is
perceptual beliefs”, he argues (1999a: 106). And both authors argue that with
giving up the “disastrous” idea of an intermediary between our mind and the
world,  there  is  no  room left  for  skepticism or  massive  error.  According  to
Davidson,  “it  is  impossible  for  most  of  our  perceptual  beliefs  to  be  false”
(1998b:  189).  Hence,  for  both Davidson  and  Putnam (real)14 perception  (or
perceptual belief) is inherently veridical as well as conceptual.15
It is from this idea that Davidson’s answer to the aforementioned most common
objection  to  coherence  theories  follows:  internal  coherence  is  sufficient.16
Because most of our (most basic) beliefs are necessarily true (because they are
caused by the world), any completely internally coherent set of beliefs must be
true. And therefore, internal coherence (with other beliefs) is sufficient to justify
(the  belief  in  the  truth  of)  some  particular  belief.  Putnam  (1999)  gives
14 As opposed to illusions and hallucinations. Putnam (1999) rejects the common suggestion that
these are indistinguishable from perception.
15 There are differences, however. For example, Davidson describes the relation between the world
and  our  perceptual  beliefs  as  causal,  while  Putnam appears  to  reject  this  suggestion.  The
disagreement  may be  largely terminological,  however,  although  this  is  difficult  to  judge  as
neither author is sufficiently clear on this issue.
16 Davidson attributes this “most common objection” to Moritz Schlick in  (1982b). He quotes
Schlick arguing that “the coherence theory is shown to be logically impossible … for by means
of it I can arrive at any number of consistent systems of statements which are incompatible with
one another”, to which he replies that “it’s not clear what it means to say I could ‘arrive’ at
various systems, since I do not invent my beliefs; most of them are not voluntary” (173).
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approximately  the  same  answer  for  approximately  the  same  reasons:  the
veridicality of perception implies that internal coherence is sufficient.
Putnam’s philosophical development can be characterized as a step-wise process
in which more constructive phases of theory development and elaboration are
interspersed with shorter, more destructive phases resulting from the realization
that the theory developed and elaborated in the preceding constructive phase can
no  longer  be  maintained  (see  introduction).  Hence,  a  comparison  between
“middle” and “late” Putnam is a comparison between two constructive phases,
which means an analysis of the destructive phase in between. Putnam gave up
his (1981a) “middle” coherence theory because it was incoherent in requiring
what it rejected, namely to compare (systems of) beliefs to reality. In (1999) he
suggests that he “went astray” because he “was still assuming something like the
sense  datum  picture”  (18),  the  “disastrous  idea  that  has  haunted  Western
philosophy since the seventeenth century” (43).
The key point of Davidson’s coherence theory – simultaneously accurately and
misleadingly  summarized  as  “coherence  yields  correspondence”  –  is  that
coherence  justifies  the  belief  that  a  belief  is  true,  and  truth  means
correspondence. The former is the case because most of our (most basic) beliefs
are necessarily true; the latter is primitive.17 Between (1981a) and (1999) Putnam
gradually moved closer to Davidson.18 If (1999) is read as an amendment of his
(1981a)  coherentism,  then  the differences between his  later  coherentism and
Davidson’s are small and subtle. 
17 Or more accurately, the concept of truth is a primitive, and that primitive concept means a kind of
correspondence with the way things are.
18 Unfortunately not just in substance, but in style as well, considering that some of Putnam’s later
writings surpass even Davidson in inscrutability.
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But is it coherentism?
Putnam’s and Davidson’s coherence theories have been largely ignored in the
debate on coherentism about justification of the last decades.19 Since the end of
the 1990s much of that debate is phrased in probabilistic terms. One of the most
influential arguments against a coherence theory of justification is presented by
Erik Olsson in (2002). It’s most recent version can be found in Olsson (2012).
The following summary is based on that version.
If E1 is the proposition that witness 1 reports that A and E2 is the proposition that
witness 2 reports that A, then coherentism claims that:
[Coherence Justification] P(A | E1, E2) > P(A) .
However, if the two testimonies are independent from each other, then it is the
case that:
[Conditional Independence] P(E2 | E1, A) = P(E2 | A) & P(E2 | E1,¬A) = P(E2 | ¬A) .
And  if  coherentist  justification  and  foundationalist  justification  are  mutually
exclusive, then the following applies:
[Non-foundationalism] P(A | E1) = P(A) & P(A | E2) = P(A) .
And from [Conditional Independence] and [Non-foundationalism] it follows that:
P(A | E1, E2) = P(A) ,
which contradicts [Coherence Justification]. Therefore, coherentism is wrong.
Of course, neither Putnam nor Davidson ever responded to this objection, but
what  their  response  would  be  can  be  easily  inferred  from  the  foregoing.
Putnam’s (1999) thesis of the veridicality of perception and Davidson’s thesis of
19 For example, in Olsson (2005) Putnam is mentioned only once in a footnote and Davidson is
quickly discarded after a brief recapitulation of the usual misunderstandings about his view.
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the veridicality of (perceptual) belief imply a rejection of [Non-foundationalism] in
favor of something like:
[Weak Foundationalism] P(A | E1) > P(A) & P(A | E2) > P(A) ,
provided  that  the  probabilistic  framework  and  conceptualization  in  terms  of
witness  reports  would  make  sense  to  them,  of  course  (which  is  far  from
obvious).  And  from  [Conditional  Independence] and  [Weak  Foundationalism] the
conclusion [Coherence Justification] does follow.
However, if Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories adhere to something like  [Weak
Foundationalism],  then  they  are  not  coherence  theories,  because  coherentism
supposedly  adheres  to  [Non-foundationalism].  Rather,  if  the  theses  of  the
veridicality  of  perception  and  belief  are  interpreted  as  a  kind  of  (weak)
foundationalism,  then  Putnam’s  and  Davidson’s  theories  of  justification  are
hybrids between coherentism and foundationalism,20 and are,  therefore,  more
closely related to other hybrids such as those defended by Susan Haack (2009)21
and Paul Thagard (2000) than to the “pure” coherentism that Olsson and others
argue  against.  This  shouldn’t  come as  a  surprise,  however,  considering  that
Davidson wrote about “a pure coherence theory” that “perhaps no one has ever
held such a theory, for it is mad” (2005a: 43).
A potentially more  serious  problem for  Davidson’s  and  Putnam’s  coherence
theories (I’ll continue to call them that, even if they really are hybrids) than that
posed by Olsson is the ambiguity of the notion of coherence. Neither Putnam,
nor Davidson ever specified what  exactly coherence means and/or requires in
this context. What does it mean for a set of beliefs to be coherent?
20 Not just Putnam’s and Davidson’s epistemological theories are hybrids; so is their metaphysics.
Both opt for a hybrid of – or intermediate position between – realism and anti-realism. Davidson
(2005a) rejects both realism and anti-realism and argues that these are not the only options, and
Putnam (1999) aims for what he calls “a middle way between reactionary metaphysics and
irresponsible relativism” (5).
21 Haack spends many pages arguing against Davidson’s coherentism, but in those pages she only
rejects the “omniscient interpreter” argument, which Davidson later rejected himself.
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Mere  non-contradiction  (in  a  logical  sense)  is  usually  (if  not  universally)
considered to be insufficient. If there is a set of beliefs B1 about a set of “things”
T1, and another set of beliefs B2 about T2, such that there is no contradictory
belief in B1 and no contradictory belief in B2, and the intersections of B1 and B2
and of T1 and T2 are empty,  then the union of B1 and B2 will  contain no
contradictory beliefs. It will, however, consist of two subsets that are completely
isolated from each other. Any belief that is isolated in this sense will be perfectly
non-contradictory with any set of beliefs it is isolated from, but this means that
any  completely  unconnected  belief  is  coherent  –  by  this  definition  of
“coherence” – and thus justified.
For  Davidson,  however,  this  objection  to  identifying  coherence  with  non-
contradiction is irrelevant for two reasons.  Firstly,  the objection assumes the
existence of discrete, individual beliefs, but according to Davidson there is no
meaningful way to individuate beliefs (1983). And secondly, even if you could
individuate  beliefs,  there  could  be  no  isolated  beliefs  (in  the  above  sense):
Davidson’s holism entails that every one of our beliefs is necessarily related to
many others (e.g. 1999d; 1995).
The brief considerations in this last section show that Putnam’s and Davidson’s
coherence theories aren’t just of historical interest, but are viable alternatives to
the  positions  commonly  recognized  by  mainstream  analytic  epistemology
(although their dependence on unfashionable views such as – but not limited to –
anti-essentialism in case of Putnam and social externalism (i.e. triangulation) and
holism in case of Davidson make it doubtful that they will be welcomed or even
understood by mainstream analytic philosophers). There may very well be other
problems for their theories, of course, but that is a matter for further research.
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